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Abstract. There were several English attempts to rethink ideas about cognition 
in  the  wake  of  the  new  attention  and  status  given  to  natural  philosophy  in  the 
seventeenth century. This article focuses on one of them, that of the Hebraist and ejected 
minister Theophilus Gale. After a brief look at some English sources for the ‘intellectual 
virtues’ of Aristotelianism, it emphasizes the strangeness of the categories of mimesis and 
experience  in  Gale’s  account  in  his  work  Philosophia  Generalis.  The  traditional  close 
connection between the intellectual virtues and the five grades of Porphyry’s logic tree 
was,  it  is  suggested  toward  the  end  of  the  piece,  a  convenient  way  of  limiting  the 
potentially  rather  large  category  of  intellectual  virtues.  The  subsequent  history  of 
‘cognitive virtues’ (and their profusion in an author like Baumgarten) shows, just as the 
strange  expansion  of  their  number  in  Gale,  the  wisdom  in  finding  some  way  of 
controlling the descriptive exercise of explaining what goes on in cognition. 
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Introduction 
The book reviews penned by members of the Royal Society and found in the Philosophical 
Transactions have not occasioned much comment. That is a pity. Of one learned work the reviewer 
wrote (with perhaps the faintest hint of irony) ‘[t]he business of the book is, to derive all arts and 
sciences  from  the  Hebrew  Church’.2  The  book  was  a  volume  by  the  ejected  preacher  and 
academic Theophilus Gale (1628-1679), a figure who is conspicuous by his absence in discussions 
of the scientific revolution.3 Yet as his discussion of the intellectual virtues shows, this arch-
Hebraizer and Renaissance polyhistor was sensitive to other strands than the antiquarian in the 
intellectual life of his time.4 We should begin to bracket him with his Cambridge namesake, the 
engaging  antiquarian  and  philologist  Thomas  Gale  (1636-1702),  a  man  with  whom  earlier 
secondary literature sometimes confused our Gale, who was elected a fellow of the Royal Society 
in 1677.  Although critical attention has focused, naturally enough, on the role that the virtues 
play  in  the  thought  of  John  Locke  (1632-1704),  an  interesting,  though  hitherto  neglected, 
discussion, published a few decades before Locke, on the topic of the Aristotelian cognitive (or 
‘intellectual’)  virtues  in  seventeenth-century  England  tells  us  much  about  the  progress  of 
philosophy in that country, and the styles of knowing that remained the common currency for 
thinkers of the period. The piece, by Theophilus Gale, is found in his bulky work Philosophia 
Generalis.5 This book shows in its eruditio similarities with Gale’s contemporary, Ralph Cudworth 
(1617-1688) (though Cudworth’s True Intellectual System was not published until 1678), and this 
rich inheritance of late humanist erudition impacts on the main focus of this article, namely how 
Gale used and developed the Aristotelian schemata of epistemology.6 In order to sketch this 
story, we will look at some of Gale’s Elizabethan and early Stuart predecessors, which will show 
evidentius his amalgam of Neoplatonic and contemporary scientific influences. This article, then, 
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attempts to put forward some new evidence to explain such a confluence in the obiter course of 
tracing the transformation7 of the Aristotelian habitus mentis in seventeenth-century England. 
                                                                                   
** 
 
    Translations, both of place and cultural empire, were the intellectual axis about which the 
career  of Theophilus Gale  pivoted.  He  arrived from  the  small  coastal town  of  Teignmouth, 
Devon in 1647 at Magdalen College, Oxford, where he graduated magister artium in 1652; He 
found a position at Winchester, but was ejected over the Act of Uniformity 1661. After a stint 
accompanying the sons of Lord Wharton to a Protestant academy in Caen, his most lasting 
translation was to London where he pursued various theological and philosophical studies in 
Newington Green, that famed nest of dissenters and intellectual radicals in the seventeenth-
century  London.  A  large  part  of  Gale’s  purpose  in  writing  the  Philosophia  Generalis  (an 
international Latin work which developed the earlier and vernacular Court of the Gentiles) was to 
eradicate the various errors of medieval thought (obviously this drive has confessional roots). Its 
alternative model is a Hebrew Church that taught what we find in the writings of Plato. He was 
particularly exercised by mystical theology, the thought of the canonists and scholasticism. His 
notion  of  Plato  and  the  particular  form  of  divine  omnipotence  underscores  this:  On  Gale’s 
account,  Platonic  teleology  (whether  mystical  or  moral)  is  the  road  to  the  experiential 
transcendence of the mystic, it is not the legalistic authority under which all things have their 
juridical essence of the canonists, and it is not the Scotist notion of unbounded power. It is rather 
a global plan for salvation, and as such is indebted to the various plans for universal Reformation 
that are a feature of the century of Jan Amos Comenius or John Dury. It is a moral plan through 
which greater things about the nature of God will be revealed: ‘That same love by which man is 
subjugated to serving god- that is, his servitude – is his liberty, which Augustine calls his vera 
libertas, his true freedom’.8 This (highly Kantian, one might add) notion of the interpenetration of 
the moral and the transcendental, is also a notion rooted in the belief in the educability through 
appropriate practice of man: all men can get to a point in their lives where they will be able to see 
the workings of this Platonist Calvinist god, and hence be saved. So much for the questions of 
the purpose of the disciplining of the mind; now we turn to the question of the nature of the 
functioning  of  this  process  of  cognitive  discipline,  and  of  the  particular  building  block  of 
Aristotelian bricolage that Gale employed for this task: the virtues. 
The  virtues  are  a subset  of  a  larger  category  of psychological  description:  the habit. 
Habitual actions or ways of being affected by something.  There are habits of the moral life (what 
we would call virtues), and there are habits of the mind. These habits of the mind are called 
traditionally ‘the intellectual virtues’. These are properties of mind in virtue of the correct exercise 
of which one may come to a proper account of reality. How did this come about? The problem 
from which the discussion of the intellectual virtues, the habitus mentis derived (and hence to 
understand its place in the philosophical tradition to which Gale was endebted) was that hoary 
Platonic dilemma of the proper division of labour between reason and experience in cognition.9 
The  main  locus  of  this  discussion  came,  however,  not  from  Platonic  sources  but  from  the 
Aristotelian  texts  that  were  the  core  of  tuition  in  the  Renaissance  arts  course.10  One  of the 
debates that flowed from this issue intimately connected the number of the intellectual virtues 
with the fashionable topic of the status of logic, thereby ensuring a wide dissemination of the 
question.(Is logic one of the intellectual virtues? Or is it merely something that serves these 
intellectual virtues?)  This discussion was already found in Iacopo Zabarella, who is cited by our 
first English author, fellow of Jesus College, Oxford, Griffith Powell (1561-1620).  The final 
chapter of Powell’s commentary on the Posterior Analytics (the first published in England) is given  
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over to this reason v experience issue.11 Aristotle, says, Powell asks two questions: first how it is 
that we have knowledge of ‘principia’ (by which he means the various principles used in the 
demonstrative syllogism) and secondly, what sort of habitus is it that achieves this cognition of 
principles?12 The first part of the Posterior Analytics had, in rather thorny fashion, established the 
notion that the process of syllogistic reasoning requires certain things to be already in place in the 
mind.13 Is this habit innate or is it acquired? To this stark disjunction Powell refuses to bow.14 
Either alternative produces, he says, absurd results.15  He resolves to tread a middle path, he says, 
which  involves the  faculty of  sense.16  But  if sense  is shared  with  beasts,  what  distinguishes, 
returns the interlocutor, man from other animals?17 The answer given is the capacity for rational 
thought,  beasts  only  having  memory  of  previous  sense  images.18  Powell  continues  with  his 
account of how human understanding operates. Experience comes from the memory of the 
repetition of (different sorts of) sense data.19 
If the argument is so far granted, it has not yet provided us with proof of the cognition of 
the principles (cognition, let us recall, being that which separates man from the beasts). This 
Powell does through a metaphor: once battle has been commenced, and the army had been 
turned to rout, if one should stand firm and return to the field and another and then another and 
so on, eventually the entire army is restored to battle. In a similar way, the soul is able to gather 
from many instances a universal, which is the beginning of every science or art.20The resort to 
metaphorics suggests a key problem for Aristotelianism. The Posterior Analytics argues that the 
human mind is so related to the world that it is able to grasp the basic categories and kinds 
existing  in  reality.  For  some  scholars,  the  text  displays  an  intuitionist  interpretation  of  non-
demonstrative  knowledge  of  first principles  and  universal  concepts;  for  others,  natural  kinds 
cause humans to know them through sense-experience and induction. But it remains mysterious 
how they are able to do this. The discussion of the strange act of intellectual intuition necessary for 
this, the foundation of his epistemology, required him to elaborate the other cognitive capacities 
in  relation  thereto,  and  against  the  general  background  notion  that  life  was  the  pleasurable 
exercise of our natural faculties.    
After  some  philosophical  badinage  about  the  precise  way  to  word  this  mysterious 
process, Powell then asks the question how one proves that it is the intellect (intellectus/intelligentia) 
that is the correct habit of the mind which effects this management of the perception of singulars. 
To this he gives the rather perfunctory response that there are four habits (logismus, opinio, scientia, 
intelligentia), since neither opinio nor logismus nor scientia is at issue, the only one left is intellect.21 
This, given the importance attached in Protestant theology to conscience, left some questions 
unanswered,  as  we  shall  see.  Less  resolutely  scholastic  and  Aristotelian  in  his  presentation, 
Andrew Willet went over similar ground in his earlier De animae natura et viribus, a work that 
Powell may had read.22 Willet suggests, in the copious and elegant Latinity typical of this work, 
that both the luxuriant world of the Platonic teaching on the soul and the arid tabula rasa notion 
of Aristotle are inaccurate.23 Syncretic in tendency, Willet faces squarely the problem of how to 
reconcile the Aristotelian account with the Protestant necessity for those seeds of moral cognition 
that go by the name of conscience (not an Aristotelian concept).24 The obvious implication that 
conscience is also a habit is not discussed in Willet, a point to which we shall return, providing 
one of the many sources for the notion ‘innate ideas’ that was to flourish in the next century. 
(The various attempts in recent secondary literature to give Ramus an important role in this story 
of the ‘new logics’ must be nuanced to the extent that considerable Ramist energies were spent in 
the 1580s and 1590s on the tortuous metalinguistic issue of deciding that judgements involving 
the habitus mentis were judgments, in fondo, about logic) 
We are clear, then, on the epistemological and anthropological origins of the virtues. The 
natural or human virtues (I am excluding what are called the supernatural virtues) have three  
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characteristics: they are habitual in the sense that they are only acquired through practice, they are 
displayed by the subject, and they have a recursive relationship to the object of enquiry or field of 
activity (and they later became opposed to the infused supernatural virtues that derived from a 
Christian God).25 These virtues divide into the moral and the intellectual, though perhaps clearer 
terminology for the two would be ethical (because they relate to character) and cognitive (clearer 
since intellect carries the wrong set of connotations for a virtue such as ars or prudentia).  For 
present purposes, we shall omit discussion of a third grouping, the virtues of the will, though one 
may find reference to them in the Elizabethan scholastic John Case (?1539-1600), since it may 
well be that they became progressively less important in the seventeenth century.26  In the same 
orthodox way, following the footsteps of an (Oxford-based?) author of an early seventeenth-
century manuscript on logic, we shall consider as nonsensical the notion of an instrumental habit 
(such as logic was supposed by some to be).27 
The reception of the philosophical virtues, both in the late antique period and the Middle 
Ages, was skewed toward an emphasis on the moral virtues at the expense of the cognitive or 
intellectual sort.28 So marked was this asymmetry that the word ‘virtue’ (replicating the Romans 
domestication of hexis as ‘virtus’, which, through its association with ‘vir’ and manliness, lost the 
cognitive element it had, to some extent, possessed in the Greek) in the medieval vernaculars 
simply meant ’moral virtue’.  Aristotle’s key discussion of his virtues occurs in the Nicomachean 
Ethics,  where  Renaissance  commentators  on  a  particular  passage  did  mention  the  intellectual 
virtues in order to solve an exegetical problem. That exegetical problem was, prima facie, a simple 
one: how to reconcile the number of the intellectual virtues given in the NE VI.3 with the 
different number given in the famous last chapter of the Posterior Analytics?  At one level, this was 
simply  a  task  requiring  an  ability  to  explain  away  the  difference  though  contextual  analysis. 
Powell,  for  example,  explains  this  away  in  precisely  terms  of  local  context.29  Alternative 
explanations to that adopted by Powell had been canvassed in the sixteenth century, but Powell is 
far from idiosyncratic, as a glance at some contemporary commentaries on Aristotle shows.30  
The problem, however, that I have termed exegetical is also conceptual: who decides how many 
virtues and states of certainty there are? For a long time, of course, the innate conservatism of the 
commentary traditions provided a certain degree of inertia, limiting the amount of traction that 
questions could have on the traditional arrangement. An analogous development (namely toward 
the expansion in the number of virtues) took place in the field of the moral virtues, though there 
the profusion of virtues as the sixteenth century moved into the seventeenth century was far 
more  marked.  Since,  however,  the  virtues  were  not  viewed  (rather  like  Juan  Luis  Vives’s 
conception of spiritus) as parts of the brain to which one could point, but rather more akin to 
cognitive functions, it was natural to ask what counted as such a virtue. Some residue of this 
debate (as to what did and did not so count) may be discovered in the basic work of Robert 
Sanderson  (1560-1625),  who  reasserts  the  fivefold  model  of  the  intellectual  virtues  (sapientia, 
intelligentia, scientia, prudentia, ars), but also comments on what kinds of state or habit are not to be 
numbered amongst the number of the virtues.31 Excluded from the definition of the intellectual 
virtues are ‘infused habits’ (divine faith), because they are the result of a one-off intuition and not 
acquired over time; moral virtues (for obvious reasons) and ‘error-laden habits’ (such as opinion, 
suspicion and human faith). Sanderson has a paragraph on the number of the virtues in which he 
gives a division based on the nature of their object (whether the reasoning is about principles or 
conclusions, and whether the object is speculative or operative), but does not go into detail.32 
The later seventeenth century had the convenient vade mecum of Rudolph Goclenius the 
Elder (1547-1628), whose dictionary of philosophical terms provided a sturdy, indeed sometimes 
stolid, conceptual cartography. The entry for habitus has a subdivision on hypolepses.33 These are 
of two sorts: uncertain (conjecture, opinion and presumption) and certain. The certain (if not  
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composite)  divides  again  into  noetic  non-inferential  or  dianoetic  discursive,  which  result  in 
intellect for the former and a further subdivision into necessary and contigent for the latter. The 
composite certain results in sapientia. This forms a steady backdrop to most seventeenth-century 
discussions of the topic, but it was only an outline. Much greater sophistication than Goclenius or 
Sanderson is in evidence in the work of the Christ Church, Oxford academic, Barten Holyday 
(1593-1661).34 Holyday’s oratio was something of a set piece of academic display, from its opening 
nod  to  the  most  famous  of  Cicero’s  Verrines  (Quousque  tandem,  Stagirita,  famae  tuae  patientia 
abutemur?) to the pointed attempt on its closing pages to take seriously the notion of a republic of 
letters (militastis fortiter stricta acie & denso agmine pro literarum republica contra grassantem ignorantiam).35 
A study of Holyday’s sources (and his precise position on the nativist vs. acquired cognition 
controversy)  must  be  kept  for  another  place,  but  suffice  to  say  that  he  raises  the  level  of 
discussion on this topic in England considerably.36   He keeps the number of the virtues at five, 
which enables him to connect one of the five orders of logical entity with one each of the virtues. 
Thus he pairs Intelligentia with Genus, Scientia with species, Differentia with Sapientia, Prudentia with 
Propria  and  finally  Ars  with  the  individual  accidentals.  Clearly  excluded  from  the  intellectual 
virtues are fides humana, opinio and experimentalis cognitio.37 
When, therefore, we turn to Gale, we are surprised by the number of habitus mentis that he 
finds  space  for.  There  are  nine:  opinio,  experientia,  imitatio,  fide,  sapientia,  scientia,  arte,  prudentia, 
intelligentia.38  A  further  and  greater  surprise  is  the  inclusion  of  experientia  (akin  to  Holyday’s 
experimentalis cognitio) and imitatio, which we will turn to shortly. Since I have suggested Gale’s 
transformation of the intellectual virtues is ‘humanist’, it would be as well to back up that claim.  
At the lowest level, there is the very extensive usage of Greek sources to bolster points.39 Related 
to this emphasis on Greek sources is the desire to construct a NeoPlatonic heritage, as a natural 
way of restoring a sense of continuity with the dead pages of Plato, an impetus which in its 
historicism is also humanistic. Naturally, as the sixteenth century moved into the seventeenth, 
history became not so much one discipline among many, but rather prima inter pares.40 One scholar 
has recently bemoaned that ‘[o]ur inability to  engage with the imposing, and often frustrating, 
complexity of late Aristotelian psychological texts mens that we know relatively little about how 
the domain of knowledge about the soul was expanded and refigured in that tradition’.41 One 
agrees heartily, although a measure of differentiation is required for Gale and more traditional 
‘late  scholastic’  authors.  At  first  sight,  Goclenius  and  Dandinus  look  as  if  they  provide  an 
argument supported by evidence; Gale, by contrast, and in more ‘philological’ mode, appears to 
have passed, or outsourced, much of the argumentative content of his work to the supporting 
array of Greek testimonia. One could, therefore, easily conclude that what Gale is engaged in is 
nothing more than a series of footnotes. We do him a misjustice if that is how we read his work. 
In order to see why, we need to look both back to the origins of the history of pia philosophia 
movement and forward to the eighteenth-century notion of intellectual progress. Briefly, we need 
to position Gale as occupying a pivotal (if not vastly significant) moment between an esoteric 
notion of a NeoPlatonic philosophical tradition and the more secular notions of the ‘unfolding’ 
of history toward progress which were so marked a feature of the intellectual life of the century 
of the French Revolution. For it was mostly as history of philosophers that the discourse of the 
history  of  philosophy  as  understood;  whereas,  with  ample  qualification,  the  word-centred 
historicist  method  encouraged  the  Cambridge  Platonists,  with  the pious  philosophers  behind 
them, to view the relevant unit of explanation in the history of philosophy the system or the 
concept or the word. This doubtless reflects the fact that the chief model in the Middle Ages and 
the sixteenth century for philosophical historiography was Diogenes Laertius, whose emphasis is 
firmly doxographic. Only with a proper appreciation of this role of philology in the shift in 
conception of the genre can we begin to understand the purpose, both partner and product of the  
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humanist method. The immediate genealogy, furthermore, of this ‘humanist method’ is with the 
English Polyhistors, such as Edward Stillingfleet’s Origines Sacrae (1663), and their attempt to 
domesticate the ‘universalist humanism’ of their continental predecessors.  
More idiosyncratically, it is a feature of Gale’s generously syncretic vision that, through 
judicious silence or seeming similarity, he is able to place together the conceptually disparate. We 
return to his discussion of experience. The second degree of cognition he deals with is experience 
or empeiria. Although in some undefined measure less certain than ‘opinion’ (which can be true or 
false), it plays, Gale avers, far from the least role in his philosophy. Plato says many fine things 
about  it,  Aristotle  too,  particularly  in  the  History  of  Animals.  Democritus  was  well  versed  in 
‘philosophia experimentali’ and is is through experience that Epicurus has his deserved place in 
philosophy.42 
 
And finally in our own century, thanks to the many different and innovative experiments 
that men have designed, the new philosophy that we embrace has been fruitful, even if, 
in some other aspects, it has certain disadvantages, not least that it could lead men to 
Atheism and Epicureansim.43 
 
We begin to see that there is a slide, endemic in the early modern literature, between the 
sense of experience and experiment, and that by emperia and experientia, Gale is thinking of the 
experiments suggested by such reformers of natural philosophy as Francis Bacon. What precisely 
does he mean? He says that he is adopting the definition of Timaeus of Locri (really, of course, 
that of Plato), who said that it was the entry point for singulars to be introducted into the 
intellect. Since each habit of mind must have a corresponding object, Gale notes that the proper 
object of experience is singulars. Faith deals with the supernatural and the revealed, reason deals 
with the ‘natural universals’ and ‘sensus’ deals with natural singulars.44 It is the senses, chiefly eye 
and ear, that serves the habit of experience; it is they that frequently places boundaries on our 
scientia, and this is particular privilege.45 Rather than look for sources in Aristotle, Gale wishes to 
emphasize the Platonic character of the value placed on sense perception and so finds, contra 
spem, some quotes from the Timaeus and the Protagoras to the effect that all knowledge comes 
from aesthesis.46  The praise of experience continues: its object is the more achieved and more 
perfect  by  reason  of  its  universality  and  presence.  Nothing  in  this  world  of  sense,  from 
technology to social organization, does not have its experiments.47 Others dealing with mere 
sterile and empty shadows, the experimentalist deals with the things themselves. Since another 
term for the habits is virtues, a convenient linguistic slide is allowed Gale when notes that the 
Italians call such people ‘virtuosi’. The large-spirited and sharp wits of this century, he notes with 
a glance at the Royal Society, have devoted themselves to these pursuits in their Academies.48 In 
common with recent scholarship on the Royal Society, and on the interconnectedness of social 
and intellectual criteria for truth-telling, Gale emphasizes the personal qualities of the men who 
have undertaken to organize themselves in this way.49 Finally, confirming either the breadth of his 
syncretic vision or the depth of his intellectual waywardness, Gale sees the roots of the fine 
qualities of the men of the Invisible College in Plato.50 
A knock-down Aristotelian response to the inclusion of this category within the number 
of the intellectual virtues would be to insist on its redundancy. After all, experience is a crucial 
feature to all the virtues; they are habits, involving practice. Or, as we have already observed 
Robert Sanderson note, experience does not provide knowledge in the Aristotelian sense. Gale 
does not deal with the first objection, but to the second it is clear that experience adds something 
to the traditional forms of knowledge. Particularly worth attending to is Gale’s account of the 
impact that this habitus mentis has on the quality of the cognitive content to which it gives rise,  
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the ideas: ‘ejus ideae sunt magis congeneres&naturales.’51 The first adjective emphasizes the notion 
that there is a natural order behind the appearances of reality, a notion that the second adjective 
confirms. This strain of thought is stressed again when he calls the experimental notions ones 
that are the more ‘connatural’ in their ability to enlighten to imperfect state of the intellect (here, 
presumably,  understood  in  the  sense  of  the  habitus  mentis).52  The  underlying  notion  that 
experimental knowledge is more secure continues in the assertion that, unlike other forms of 
knowledge,  they  are  intimately  united  with,  not  merely  stuck  on  to,  the  intellect.  A  telling 
metaphorical aside (that these notions are almost seen) testifies to the force of this experimental 
knowledge, though it is this seductive metaphor that precisely makes us question exactly what 
kind of epistemology is operative, whilst allowing us to see why it is so attractive.53 Despite its 
status as metaphor, Gale builds on the argument it suggests to note, as his final proof in a list of 
why experimental knowledge is superior to other sorts, that they have a more intimate union with 
the soul.54 
  Not  only,  however,  Gale  continues,  are  the  results  better  but  the  very  style  of 
cognition is better (‘ex modo cognitionis’).55 The particular language in which he couches this 
praise of the mode of cognition shows how far Gale’s conception of the role of experience in the 
intellectual virtues has travelled from someone like Barten Holyday. This kind of cognition, he 
notes, is intuitive and not abstractive.56 The routes of the notion of ‘cognitio intuitiva’ are in the 
medieval period.57 What kind of knowledge does a human need of the world in order for that 
knowledge to be convincing (to himself? to others?). Since there was a long scholastic tradition 
affirming that God did not need to go through the steps of human cognition, but could, through 
cognitio  intuitiva,  understand  all  through  particulars,  the  question  is  what  kind  of  model  of 
knowledge is this for humans? To repeat, the role of the supernatural realm in deciding questions 
of human cognition could not be abandoned in a Christian culture. What sort of perception 
angels had had been a topic for scholastic disputation for as long as scholasticism.58  It is most 
tempting to imagine that the nominalist (and behind the nominalists, Scotus) tradition of the 
cognitio intuitiva had not only an impact on Calvin. The possible influence on John Mair on Calvin 
is disputed, but even if influential (albeit silently so) on his notion of a certain inner conviction 
that confers knowledge, it cannot be maintained as a discrete unit of historical analysis for those 
in the generation after Calvin.  
  The difficulties in tracking an evidential trail from the Scotists and the nominalists to 
Theophilus Gale are avoided by the convenient expedient of a sixteenth-century reflection of this 
debate. This may be found in the many editions to which the Julius Caesar Scaliger’s (1484-
1558)Exercitationes on the De subtilitate of Cardano ran.59 Ever since the endlessly recycled Elder 
Scaliger  had  placed  centre  stage  the  problem  of  how  one  could  know  substances  from  the 
accidents conveyed through a mere species (itself a rehearsal of earlier nominalist worries found 
chiefly in William of Ockham), the issue of what the scope of such non-inferential knowledge of 
essences through accidents continued to appear, though not always in precisely either Scaliger’s or 
Ockham’s terminology. Whether or not, of course, man was capable of such intuitive knowledge 
of God was a matter of dispute, but the logical undergirding set the terms of the debate. Another 
Cambridge man, and fellow the Royal Society, John Pearson, eventually Master of Trinity (1612-
1686), was fully endebted to this tradition in scholastic theology (and the analogy with vision) 
when he set down his account of why to the ‘intellectual eye’ God was invisible.60 The virtuoso of 
the Royal Society becomes, like God, someone who can see all at once from the particulars (and 
their  substantial  form)  alone.  This  has  been  influential  in  the  recent  book  on  Descartes  by 
Carriero.61 The dizzying vertigo one might feel in such a situation perhaps accounts for another 
reason that Gales in defence of the kind of knowledge that experience brings, namely, that is  
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more liable to have an impact on the emotions: ‘est magis affectiva’ (and hence more practical, 
for effecting the affects will result in action).62 One might compare Thomas Browne:  
 
For the eyes of God, and perhaps also of our glorified selves, shall as really behold and 
contemplate the World in its Epitome or contracted essence, as now it doth at large and 
in  its  dilated  substance.  In  the  seed  of  a  Plant  to  the  eyes  of  God,  and  to  the 
understanding  of  man,  there  exists,  though  in  an  invisible  way,  the  perfect  leaves, 
flowers, and fruit thereof; (for things that are in posse to the sense, are actually existent 
to  the  understanding.)  Thus  God  beholds  all  things,  who  contemplates  as  fully  his 
workes in their Epitome, as in their full volume; and beheld as amply the whole world in 
that little compendium of the sixth day, as in the scattered and dilated pieces of those 
five before.63 
 
  The mind can be as emotional as the heart.  Naturally, given Gale’s inclination to 
discover in Plato what is distinctive about the philosophy of the empiricks, we find this aspect too 
backed up with a slew of references to Platonic dialogues. 
  Now  returning  to  the  central  issue,  it  is  the  role  of  the  sensitive  soul  to  pass 
information to the rational soul, so there is a deep connection in Aristotelianism between the two 
aspects of cognition. How closely they work with each other varies from thinker to thinker, but 
there are instances of a seventeenth-century concern about whether or not to expand the range of 
sensibles (the sensibilia in Aristoteliant terminology) that may have some relation to cognition.64 
Whether this is part of a general shift in favour of the rehabilitation of the sensibles (including 
related  problems  of  animal  speech  and  animal  cognition),  just  as  with  Gale’s  attempted 
rehabilitation of experiential ratiocination, or whether each ‘rehabilitation’ is better explained by 
more local factors is a fruitful avenue for further research.65An important signpost on the route to 
such research is that what has shifted here is the abandonment of the substantial form, or the 
Aristotelian  sense  of  form  generally.  This  generates  a  fundamental  problem:    If  the  real 
distinction between divine intellect and human is that God has access to the forms and essences 
of things, we only to their accidents, there is motive there for shifting the idea of the best 
knowledge from the knowledge of universals, forms, etc., to the knowledge of qualities, accidents, 
although Gale’s interest in ‘virtuosi’ are another ‘local’ explanatory factor. 
 
A similar rehabilitatory departure in Gale’s account of the intellectual virtues is the place 
accorded imitatio: 
   
The third degree of cognition is Imitation, which is called eikasia or mimesis by Plato. It 
follows upon experience in hardly any other fashion than a shadow follows its maker. 
For just as the sense receive within themselves ideas, based on experience and having 
objective reality, of singular things, so the fancy, which is the most mimic and imitator of 
Nature, contemplates those same ideas it has received and paints of them in the most 
lively colours its fancies or other images, whence emerges the imitation.66 
 
Put crudely, for Imitatio Gale intends almost any form of symbolic representation: the 
Egyptian hieroglyphs (which often featured in accounts of artificial languages), the parables of 
Christ  and  the  sacraments  of  the  Christian  Church  are  just  three  he  mentions.67  This  is 
presumably  a  nod,  inter  alia,  to  a  well-known  passage  of  Francis  Bacon  on  parables  and 
hieroglyphs  on  the  nature  of  philosophical  writing,  but  it  is  strange  that  it  should  be  here 
interpreted as an intellectual virtue by itself.68  Here again we see how, without the clear schema  
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of the five logical voces to tie the five intellectual virtues to, the notion of what counts as an 
intellectual virtue can sprawl, go forth and multiply. After all, early modern anthropology tended 
to consider man under one of two essential aspects, as a speaking animal and as a thinking animal. 
Man, however, as a symbolic or sign-making creature, though well-established in the esoteric 
literature, found less purchase in arts course philosophy, whether in England or elsewhere. Why 
Gale  should  have  included  imitatio,  however,  is  related  to  his  elevation  of  the  concept  of 
experientia.  It is prima facie surprising to discover that the highly derivative ontology of Platonic 
mimesis should have a role in the cognitive faculties, but the emphasis on learning by doing, by 
the virtue of habitual training of hand and eye, makes it essential for the strange set of intuitions 
Gale  wants  to  accommodate.  Although  the  seventeenth  century  saw  a  rise  in  the  interest, 
sometimes philosophical, at others practical, of artificial languages which generated thought on 
the relation of mind to language, the elaboration of an intellectual virtue in these terms, rooted in 
a deeply eirenic and humanist historical account of the pia philosophia, is another example of the 
transformations wrought in the forms of cognition by the broad attention to philosophy’s past 
that was one part of the long legacy of the Quattrocento grammarians.  
             
Conclusions  
The early twentieth-century historian of philosophy, Karl Eschweiler (1886-1936), more 
informed about Renaissance philosophy than most, wrote:  
 
Die breite Diskussion über den Charakter der Logik bietet das mächtige Material dazu, 
aber nicht das ganze; denn das Denken hat nur als eine besondere Art des Produzierens 
und die Logik nur als Spezies der ars (techne) bzw. des usus organicus (instrumentalis) 
gegolten.  Der  überlieferte  Locus  communis  von  den  Quinque  habitus  intellectivi 
(sapientia-scientia-intellectus-ars-prudentia) ist dabei als wichtiger Fundort zu beachten, 
an  dem  die  Wandlung  des  aristotelischen  Wissenschaftsbegriffs  in  der  doppelten 
Richtung des konstruktiven Rationalismus wie des pragmatistischen Positivismus sehr oft 
zum Vorschein kommt.69 
 
He had in mind something rather different from what we see going in with Gale, and yet 
he was right to see the cognitive habitus of the Renaissance scholastics as central to the task of 
mediating the logical and the epistemological, and to see how a shift in these virtues could result 
in an important shift in the overall character of one’s philosophical system. As we have seen, it is 
important to find some way of anchoring their number in some stable external, such as the five 
orders of logical entity referred to by Porphyry (as with Holyday, and others). One strategic 
almost  fortuitous  factor  that  limited  the  number  of  the  intellectual  virtues  is  their  clear 
connection  with  a  clearly  hierarchy  of  grades  of  knowledge.  Certainly,  however,  once  this 
connection between the human virtue and its object of enquiry or field of activity was severed, a 
situation similar to that described for the moral virtues arose: a mushroom-like profusion of 
virtues. Once admits the principle that virtues are good things, where does one stop? When the 
German philosopher Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-1766) came to write his enormously 
influential textbook Metaphysica, he devotes a section entitled ‘perspicacia’ to covering what is a 
general cognitive virtue, which has its corresponding habit ‘acumen’. 70  By this time, however,  
the intellectual virtues had been reduced to merely good qualities that one could ascribe to a 
person’s thought, and epistemology had already become a discipline that was concerned with 
being able to find reasons for believing  in the existence of objects rather than a training in 
cognitive and oratorical fluency, such as was provided by the interrelated arts of the trivium in the 
Renaissance.71 One might almost say, with a measure of exaggeration, that the habits of mind had  
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become  indistinguishable  from  habits  (in  the  modern  sense)  of  style.  This  was  a  move  that 
ensured the death of that vigorous tradition of the intellectual virtues to which figures such as 
Gale  made  their  distinctive  contribution.72  Baumgarten’s  greater  emphasis  upon  sensory 
perception, divorced from cognitive content and epistemological value, was in time to help found 
the science of aesthetics. Such aesthetics, however, were far removed from an Aristotelian world 
in which perception and cognitive content were closely aligned.73As such, it sounded an early note 
in  the  separation  of  the  human  from  the  natural  sciences.  One  doubts  whether  the  book 
reviewers of so determinedly interdisciplinary an institution as the Royal Society would have 
approved. 
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